Iraq: Levin Floor Speech on Need to Begin Phased Redeployment of U.S. Troops This Year: 06/21/06
The current open-ended commitment of U.S. forces in Iraq is unsustainable and counterproductive, contributing as much to Iraqi instability as it does to Iraqi security.Our troops have performed magnificently in Iraq. We are all deeply grateful for their professionalism and their sacrifices. But, ultimately, as our military commanders have repeatedly said, stability in Iraq can only come through a political settlement by the Iraqis, and the best way to bring about that political settlement is to make it clear, in words not yet spoken by the administration, that our commitment is not open-ended, and that a phased redeployment of our forces from Iraq will begin by the end of this year.
The administration’s refrain that we are in Iraq as long as the Iraqis need us is creating a dependency of unlimited duration and gives the Iraqis the impression that their security is more in our hands than in theirs.
The hallmarks of the administration’s open-ended policy are the President’s extraordinarily broad and vague description of our mission–nothing less than “complete victory,'’ as he put it, along with the President’s explicit commitment to stay until the Iraqis can “govern themselves, sustain themselves, and defend themselves.'’ The President’s statement that American force levels in Iraq “will be decided by future Presidents'’ reinforced that unlimited commitment, as did Secretary Rice’s statement that we will stay in Iraq “as long as we are needed.'’
The President of Iraq, Mr. Talabani, reflected the Iraqi perception of the administration’s policy when he said that U.S. forces are “ready to stay as long as we ask them no matter what the period is.'’ That is what the President of Iraq says he understands our policy to be, that U.S. forces are “ready to stay as long as we,'’ the Iraqis, “ask them, no matter what the period is.'’ We must change that Iraqi perception and the open-ended commitment which led to it, and that is what our amendment would do.
Our amendment urges the President to begin the phased redeployment of U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of 2006–to begin the phased redeployment of U.S. troops by the end of 2006. Our amendment also calls for a number of actions to help achieve the broad-based and sustainable political settlement so essential for defeating the insurgency and preventing all-out civil war.
It calls for adoption by the Iraqis of a fair sharing of political power and economic resources among all the Iraqi groups so as to invest them in the formation of an Iraqi Nation. That can be done by amendment to the Iraq Constitution or by legislation or other means, but it needs to be done within the timeframe provided for in the Iraqi Constitution; namely, 4 months from the beginning of the functioning of their parliament.
An international conference needs to be convened so as to more actively involve the international community and Iraq’s neighbors in promoting a durable political settlement among Iraqis and by reducing regional interference in Iraq’s internal affairs. It is also important to encourage more countries to contribute to Iraq’s extensive needs and to ensure that pledged funds are forthcoming.
Our amendment also points out that it is critically important for the Government of Iraq to promptly and decisively disarm the militias and remove those members of the Iraqi security forces whose loyalty to the Iraqi Government is in doubt.
Now, what does our amendment urge the President to do relative to our troops in Iraq?
First, after consultation with the Government of Iraq, begin a phased redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq by the end of this year.
Second, submit to Congress a plan by the end of 2006 with estimated dates for the continued phased redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq, with the understanding that unexpected contingencies may arise.
Third, expedite the transition of U.S. forces in Iraq to a limited presence and mission of training, providing logistical support, protecting U.S. infrastructure and personnel, and participating in targeted counter-terrorism activities.
Our amendment does not establish a fixed ending date for redeployment. It doesn’t set out fixed milestones once the phased redeployment has begun. So while it does not establish a timetable, it does establish a fixed, but not precipitous, time for the beginning of a phased redeployment–by the end of this year.
Beginning the phased redeployment of American troops in 2006 would send a very clear message to the Iraqis: We have been in Iraq over 3 years. We have lost 2,500 brave Americans and suffered more than seven times that number of casualties to make it possible for Iraq to become a free Nation. You, the Iraqis, must now decide whether you want a civil war or a nation.
Sending that message to the Iraqis and ending the open-ended U.S. policy towards Iraq will prod the Iraqis to take the necessary steps to end the dominance of the militias; will reduce the Iraqi dependence on the U.S. security blanket which deters tough choices by the Iraqis; will change the perception that we are permanently occupying Iraq, a perception which plays into the hands of terrorists; will reduce the number of U.S. targets for terrorists and insurgents; and will reduce the strain on U.S. forces.
Supporters of our amendment are just as determined to maximize prospects for success in Iraq as are the opponents of our amendment. We do not accuse opponents of our amendment of wanting failure or of advocating surrender to chaos and terror. We do believe that maintaining the status quo and the open-ended commitment, which is the hallmark of that status quo and that open-ended commitment, and adhering to a bumper sticker slogan of “stay the course'’ is a recipe for continuing instability and failure.
Success isn’t assured in any event, but letting the Iraqis know that we are not there for as long as they want us is key to avoiding a culture of dependency. The bottom line is that our open-ended policy and presence has become a deterrent to the very success that we want to bring about. Although the administration policy is aimed at providing security, it is a major contributor to instability.
The Iraqi leaders themselves have set a 6-month goal for making major progress in assuming their security responsibility. Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki said on May 22 that his government could take over security for 16 of Iraq’s 18 provinces by the end of this year.
On June 11, the Iraqi National Security Adviser, Mr. Rubaie said:
“I believe by the end of this year the number of the multinational forces will be probably less than 100,000 in this country.”
That amounts to a reduction of at least 30,000 U.S. forces by the end of this year. Mr. Rubaie repeated that position in an op-ed in yesterday’s Washington Post. He, again, is the National Security Adviser to the Prime Minister. Our amendment’s call for the beginning of a phased redeployment by the end of this year fits the very goals Iraq’s leaders have set for themselves.
Listen to what Mr. Rubaie wrote about the many benefits of Iraq reducing the number of coalition forces. This is benefits to Iraq of our reducing the number of coalition forces in Iraq:
“It will remove psychological barriers and the reason that many Iraqis joined the so-called resistance in the first place. The removal of troops will also allow the Iraqi government to engage with some of our neighbors that have to date been at the very least sympathetic to the resistance because of what they call the coalition occupation.
“Moreover, the removal of foreign troops will legitimize Iraq’s government in the eyes of its people … the drawdown of foreign troops will strengthen our fledgling government to last the full four years it is supposed to.”
Mr. Rubaie’s words are similar to those of General George Casey, the commander of the U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq, who told Congress last fall:
“Increased coalition presence feeds the notion of occupation, contributes to the dependency of Iraqi forces on the coalition, extends the time it will take Iraqi security forces to become self-reliant, and exposes more coalition forces to attack at a time when Iraqi security forces are increasingly available and capable.”
That is our commander talking about the disadvantages of having a large number of troops remain in Iraq.
Regardless of one’s views on whether it was wise to attack Iraq–and I for one thought it was unwise, and so voted–and regardless of one’s views on whether the war has been well managed–and I have been critical of the administration’s management–all of us want to maximize the chances for success in Iraq. To maximize the chances for success in Iraq, the Iraqis must take control of their country. Our approach, our amendment, maximizes the chance for success.
Last year, by a bipartisan vote of 79 to 16, the Senate adopted an amendment stating that:
“[C]alendar year 2006 should be a period of significant transition to full Iraqi sovereignty.”
The Senate language remained in the bill and was signed into law. Our amendment implements that policy direction. The Iraqis are standing up. U.S. and coalition forces have trained and equipped more than 250,000 Iraq security forces. More than two-thirds of Iraq’s Army combat battalions are either in the lead or operating independently, according to the administration’s May 2006 report to Congress. It is now time for the United States to set a date for the beginning–the beginning of a standdown.
Last fall, General Casey said that our presence in Iraq “fuels the insurgency'’ and that “beginning to reduce our presence in Iraq'’ as conditions warrant would result in “taking away one of the elements that fuels the insurgency.'’ That is our commander speaking. Conditions not only warrant the beginning of a reduction of our presence, conditions are such that only a phased, orderly redeployment beginning by the end of this year will maximize the chances of succeeding in Iraq.
By making clear that a phased redeployment of our forces from Iraq needs to begin this year, we will send a clear message to the Iraqis that our presence is not an open-ended security blanket and that they need to assume responsibility for their own future.